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Words and Worlds: Irony Makes Literary Creations
  Alastair Goff 
Abstract
In this paper I take up anew the suggestion recurrent in the
work of Kierkegaard and Lukács, among others, that literature
is fundamentally ironic. Literary creations, I argue, are ironic
because they convey the real world, even though the
worldhood of this world is ineffable. In creating a world from
words in a novel or poem, the author confronts his or her own
scepticism about the possibilities of written expression.
Literary creations are only completed when the reader is able
to engage with the world of words that is constituted in the
work, and to realize that what is said in the writing does not
exhaust the literary creation as a whole.
Key Words
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1. Introduction
In The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard struck the method of
Socrates against the work of Hegel, Solger, and Friedrich
Schlegel, sparking a fire so bright as to make literature's ironic
shadow, that the beauty of the work of art had up until then
diminished, suddenly obvious to all. The irony of literature
does not emerge in the craftsman-like manipulation of tropes
within the manifold of a work, but is the spirit that
characterizes it in its unity and defines the act of writing itself.
Irony, maintains Kierkegaard, "is not present at some
particular point of the poem, but is omnipresent in it, so that
the irony visible in the poem is in turn ironically controlled.
Therefore irony simultaneously makes the poem and the poet
free."[1]
Yet irony is both the essence of literature and its fundamental
failing-the quality that means that literature can never
"reconcile" us with the factual world we must inhabit.[2] In
leading us to see literature for its ironic self, Kierkegaard pre-
empts the contemporary dismissal of literature as negatively
escapist. Poetry is here, as for Plato, an attempt to evade the
world rather than to better understand it. This paper aims to
reject all such claims about literature and irony, to show
indeed that it is only through irony that a connection between
writing and the world is established. It is not a debasing
escapist tendency that drives literature towards irony but the
author's realization of the limits of the word-her or his
acknowledgement of what can and cannot be written.
The second part of this paper will contain reflections on irony
itself-whether there is such a thing as a "concept" of irony and
whether irony can be defined. This section will undergird all
my later arguments. The third part will set out the ironic
nature of literary creations. The fourth section will briefly
distinguish ironic from symbolic conceptions of literature. The
fifth section will explain why irony is necessary to literature.
While this paper takes aesthetics as its subject and is a work
of philosophy, the discussion will significantly incorporate
considerations drawn from literary theory; hence, an ulterior
interest of this essay is to display how critical examinations of
literature can profoundly enrich the philosophy of literature
and aesthetics.
2. What Is Irony?
Irony is a concept that has become progressively more
diversified throughout the history of literary theory. Friedrich
Schlegel's response to the unremitting recurrence of examples
of irony in everyday life seems equally appropriate as a
reaction to the diverse incarnations of irony we encounter in
contemporary scholarship: liberal irony; romantic irony;
absolute irony; suspensive or post-modern irony; ethical irony;
dialogic irony; systemic irony; negating irony; judicial irony;
new-critical irony; rhetorical irony; dramatic irony; poetic
irony; classical irony; comic and tragic irony. . . "What gods
will rescue us from all these ironies?"[3] Although I do not
consider the project a hopeless one, a book-length literary
survey would be the only suitable medium for the construction
of a definition that delineates and integrates the features that
make these various permutations of irony irony. Thus I will
here consider only the vital characteristics that these forms of
irony possess in common, and utilize a description of these key
elements as the basis for my discussion of the irony of literary
creations.
Irony is a form of self-negation; its intention is always to deny
the meaning that the written or spoken words make clear.
Kierkegaard refers to the ironic trope as a figure of speech
that "cancels itself."[4] According to Joseph Dane, this
characteristic of irony possesses its origins in the earliest
rhetorical uses of the ironic mode. The rhetorician who, in
pronouncing ironically, claims superiority over the target of his
or her criticisms, establishes a hierarchical relationship
between him- or herself and the ironic subject of criticism (the
eirōn). It is over the eirōn that the ironist is victorious.
Following romantic irony, notes Dane, this hierarchy of
persons is translated to the arena of meaning, and all ironic
discourse comes to manifest a hierarchy that reflects the
relationship of speaker and eirōn: the hidden meaning of
language that is wielded ironically takes precedence over the
meaning that is superficially obvious.[5] However, even if self-
negation is vital to irony, the phrase that is subordinated and
overcome is not consequently forgotten. The real meaning of
the ironic statement is hidden and not understood by all, but
should the possibility of moving between the superficial and
hidden meanings disappear, irony itself becomes lost. That
irony is not the higher, freer meaning alone cannot be
neglected.
Irony must therefore be interpreted as both what is said and
as more than what is said.[6] Words left unpronounced
constitute the sharp edge of ironic discourse. However, this
layer of meaning that transcends open speech may well
contain, not simply meanings the direct verbalization of which
would lessen their effect, but likewise thoughts that could
never receive proper expression. J.A.K. Thomson illuminates
this quality of irony through a comparison between two
descriptions of cities in plague times-the account provided by
Thucydides in his history of the Peloponnesian War and the
story presented in Daniel Defoe's Journal of the Plague Year.
Where Defoe's tale is resplendent with detail, Thucydides
devotes no more than a few pages to description of the plague
that beset Athens. Recognizing that, despite its brevity, the
account of Thucydides is inestimably more affecting than that
of Defoe, Thomson reflects thus on Thucydides' retelling:
"There is no more to be said, he implies. But none knew better
that there was a great deal more to be thought and felt; and
when this happens we have Irony."[7] Thomson highlights the
inaccuracy that inheres in imagining ironic discourse to consist
exclusively in a contrast between enunciable propositions:
irony presents thoughts that cannot be articulated. It is more
than it seems, and does not merely say more than it
apparently does. Irony accomplishes not just "what lies beyond
the reach of direct communication" but conveys ideas that
entirely surpass verbalization.[8]
If my comments thus far have pertained to the structure of
irony, then the spirit of irony is inherently sceptical. Whether
this is true in the sense that the ironist is doubtful about the
claim that the real world possesses on his or her purposeful
attention, such that s/he can, in good conscience, endeavor to
escape it, or whether the ironist begins from the belief that
reality can never be understood by non-ironic discourse and so
depends on the ironic mode in order to be comprehended may,
at this point, remain an open question. However, I think
Richard Rorty captures something peculiar to the doubt that
lies at the core of irony in characterizing the ironist as being in
possession of an awareness of "the contingency and fragility"
of the terms that s/he uses to describe him- or herself and
life.[9] This Rortian scepticism about one's "vocabulary"
tessellates with the more general thought that irony always
possesses a target of doubt, something from which it is
possible for the ironist, or the higher meaning of the ironic
phrase, to become alienated.[10]
The real place of this "higher meaning" in irony is one of the
latter's great subtleties, and consequently demands more
explicit consideration than it has received thus far.[11] Irony
does not reveal a higher meaning because, if it is higher, this
meaning is also hidden by the ironic phrase that always puts
itself in the way of the truth. At most, irony conveys a higher
meaning. The presence of a higher meaning differentiates
irony from a similar feature of language with which it is fated
to be confused. Irony is not insincerity but a specific
development of it. In simple insincerity, the presentation of an
explicit meaning-that characterizes irony-is not accompanied
by the offering of an alternate, higher meaning. Yet it is
reductive and false to suggest that the insincere statement
proposes itself only when nothing at all is meant. Rather,
insincerity deliberately closes off its true intention by declining
to indicate that a phrase should not be accepted for what it
seems. Insincerity lets the higher meaning remain the private
property of the speaker or writer. In irony at least the
existence of hidden content, if not the actual nature of that
content, is presented to an audience along with the obvious
meaning. For example, rhetorical irony introduces the use of
gesture to indicate that a higher meaning lies behind the
spoken phrases.[12]
The esotericism of the ironic statement is perhaps the theme
that leads Kierkegaard's treatment of irony astray. One of his
earliest assumptions concerning the ironic mode is that it is in
its nature not to "unmask" itself.[13] From this nascent step,
it appears unavoidable that Kierkegaard should conclude irony
to be a form of discourse that is inherently dismissive of
actuality, so that the "freedom" that irony engenders must
inevitably resolve itself into "negative independence of
everything." However, later in the same work Kierkegaard
suggests that irony "wants to be understood," even if it does
not desire to be understood at once.[14] Perhaps
Kierkegaard's real intention in arguing that irony does not
unmask itself is to imply that the final revelation of the ironic
phrase is accomplished by an audience rather than by the
ironist. Yet speculation on the interpretation of Kierkegaard is
not the interest of this essay. For our own purposes we need
only appreciate that, even insofar as the higher meaning of
irony is intended only for the initiated, irony never fails to
include an invitation for an audience to undergo initiation for
itself, and that it is for this reason that it should be
distinguished from mere insincerity.
3. Literature as Irony
If irony involves the features that I have set down, that
literature is ironic is still not apparent. This section will contain
an argument towards that conclusion. Literary creations are
ironic because they offer an imaginary world built up out of
words, yet intend by that construction the real world itself.
What can be written on the page is far removed from the
world in which I live from day to day, and yet the fact that, as
a reader, I understand the novel or poem to occur in just that
world, the world that I inhabit, entails that it presents a
meaning that lies beyond that of the word. Beside or behind
the world of words thrives my world, and this is the world that
the creation brings forth. Literature is ironic, not in that it
"purports to be about the world and yet is fiction," because
through the fictional it refers to the real, but because the
world of the creation is the real world, even if the words
themselves create for us something other than that.[15] How
is this to be shown?
George Lukács identifies the following basis for the irony of the
novel:
The irony of the novel is the correction of the
world's fragility: inadequate relations can
transform themselves into a fanciful yet well-
ordered round of misunderstandings and cross-
purposes, within which everything is seen as
many-sided, within which things appear as
isolated and yet connected, as full of value and
yet totally devoid of it, as abstract fragments and
as concrete autonomous life, as flowering and as
decaying, as the infliction of suffering and as
suffering itself.[16]
The comment is ambiguous. Does Lukács mean that literature
is ironic in presenting a sense of the world as it does not exist
factually, with no hint of the actual state of the real? If so,
then the novel is surely insincere rather than ironic and, in this
passage, Lukács at most proves that a book can be written
only with tongue-in-cheek. Literature, on this reading, lacks
substance. Alternatively, perhaps Lukács intends to imply that
the literary creation, as a vision that is plainly an amended
version of the real world, brings out the way the world truly is.
The world offered in the words of the work is finer than the
real world, even if the true meaning is always the reality that I
inhabit and that the work conceals. This second reading more
obviously skirts the mire of simple insincerity and provides us
with this reason for preferring it.[17] Is Lukács' argument
therefore true? It is important to consider his claim more
rigorously.
Lukács begins with the thought that the objective, real world is
a disordered, fragile chaos characterized by incomplete
relations. The world manifests the fragmentariness of
Becoming rather than the permanence of Being. The novel,
that purports to present this world as it is objectively, shows
the relations that constitute it as complete and stable,
endowing it with both unity and coherency. Since the world
founded in the novel inescapably originates in an "act of
consciousness" and the understanding that it achieves remains
vested in the viewpoint of a subject, this world of words cannot
correspond to the objective real world. The novel is ironic in
that its attempt to present objective knowledge of the real
world betrays itself as a fiction that human subjectivity endows
with its structure.[18] The world of the novel never captures
the "homogeneous, organic form of nature," although this is
what it seeks to convey.[19] This conception of the irony of
the novel is original and insightful. However, it is not the
correct understanding of the irony of literature; or, at least, it
is questionable whether it remains the correct understanding
any longer.
The novel, for Lukács, is a form of writing that attains its apex
in the works of Dostoevsky. And the novel derives its superior
interest for Lukács from the point in intellectual history
reached by European culture in the first decades of the
twentieth century. He marks out a triadic relationship between
the novel, irony, and the intellectual progress of Western
civilization:
Irony, the self-surmounting of a subjectivity that
has gone as far as it was possible to go, is the
highest freedom that can be achieved in a world
without god. That is why it is not only the sole
possible a priori condition for a true, totality-
creating objectivity, but also why it makes that
totality-the novel-the representative art-form of
our age: because the structural categories of the
novel constitutively coincide with the world as it
is today.[20]
There are two clear reasons for questioning this diagnosis of
the irony of the novel. First, the irony that Lukács identifies is
not unique to the novel; second, if we refer to the
development of literature since the early twentieth century,
the world of the novel is no longer characterized by the type of
irony that he describes.
Can the irony that Lukács identifies in the epic novel separate
itself from a similar irony that seems evident in the human
and natural sciences? Like the epic novel, these disciplines
claim to possess objective knowledge of the world, and yet
their products remain the casts of human consciousness. The
point is given particular clarity when we refer to the natural
sciences, the peerless objectivity of whose results was long
assumed. (The objectivity of the investigations of the human
sciences seems, in an important and productive sense, always
to have been subject to question.)[21] One achievement of
the philosophy of science in the twentieth century was the
realization that the objective view of the world composed by
the investigations of the natural sciences is not to be
celebrated as pristine and god-like. An insight from Hans
Stubbe, given in the postscript to a book by Christa Wolf to
which I will refer again in this section, proves particularly
elucidative in this regard. Stubbe reflects on the shared status
of their works as deliberate acts of human subjects as a
reason for identifying an affinity between the writer and the
scientific researcher. Characteristic of the labour of both writer
and scientist is:
First of all, the inspired grasping of an idea as a
creative process, then the analytical work on the
details of the material and finally the composition,
the gathering together and arrangement of all the
facts into a higher system of knowledge which
leads to a clear scientific picture of the
world.[22]
The irony which, for Lukács, makes the novel representative of
his age, is equally fundamental to the knowledge-claims of the
natural sciences; for, as Stubbe suggests, neither the
scientist's results nor the writer's story ever elude their status
as acts of human consciousness. All comprehension, be it
artistic or scientific, is also a form of "correction." Thus, the
irony of the novel is not idiosyncratic, because in offering an
understanding of the world that is a false image of the pure
objectivity that defines the view of god, the structure of the
novel does not differentiate itself from the structure that
distinguishes the human and natural sciences. The novel may
be ironic, but this is an irony that is indistinguishable from that
which infuses other forms of human knowledge.
A second motive for questioning the truth of Lukács' thesis on
the irony of the novel emerges when we reflect on the
conceptions of human understanding laid out in the writing of
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In such literature, it
is at least not obvious that the objective knowledge that god
would possess emerges as one element in an ironic
juxtaposition. The possibilities that distinguish human
understanding-the necessarily finite and subjective character
of knowledge that is inescapably a product of consciousness-
have become explicit rather than ironic themes for literature.
In works modern and post-modern, an overt interest is human
understanding itself. Consider, among novels, Faulkner's
Absalom, Absalom! and, in poetry, Wallace Stevens' "Thirteen
Ways of looking at a Blackbird."[23] In a novel such as
Absalom, Absalom!, human subjectivity, manifested in the
narrator, supersedes the objective viewpoint of god as the
foundation for knowledge. The understanding of the subject
presented in the world of the novel is a theme to be explicitly
interrogated. And if we cannot easily or lightly accept Adorno's
judgment that, since The Theory of the Novel, in all worthwhile
novels "an unleashed subjectivity turns into its opposite
through its own momentum," objectivity arising throug-and
only through-the consciousness of a human subject, it is
nonetheless apparent that the conditions under which
contemporary writing occurs are not those that Lukács
describes as pertinent to the writing of the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, and that his ascription of irony to
the novel cannot be made to apply seamlessly to modern and
post-modern literary creations.[24]
Even if Lukács' interpretation of the irony of literature does not
survive the developments in writing since the publication of
The Theory of the Novel, reflection on his argument reveals it
to be driven by a recognition that does seem unsullied and
permanent. Essential to Lukács' position is the thought that a
literary creation involves a clash between two separate worlds:
the world of the fiction and the real world. The former is a
world made of words and the latter the world that we inhabit;
the one an act of consciousness, the other a free product of
organic processes.
This distinction between worlds is, in itself, appropriate:
Lukács errs only in assuming the scepticism of the writer to be
epistemological, as possessing its foundations in "not-desiring-
to-know and not-being-able-to-know."[25] The failure of his
view of the irony of the novel stems from the fact that it takes
doubt about the possibilities for knowledge as its basis. The
irony that is supposedly authentic to the novel also
characterizes the understanding of the sciences; the
knowledge that a subject is capable of becomes, in the novels
of the twentieth century, a theme that is overtly explored
rather than a component of irony. However, if epistemological
scepticism is not the grounds of the irony of the novel, another
form of scepticism may nonetheless impose itself in literary
creations.
Rather than embodying the epistemological scepticism that,
for Lukács, defines his age, literary writing is challenged and
guided by scepticism about the possibility of expression-an
awareness of the inability of words to impart or represent the
real world. The question is not whether-or how-it is possible
to know the world, but whether words are capable of
conveying it insofar as it is known. The world constructed out
of words in the novel is fantastically different from the world
that we each inhabit. Is this a problem we can just pass by? Is
the point itself unarguable? Are there no novels that at least
approach expression of the richness of the real and so defeat
the possibility for irony, no poems that close upon and
"capture" things as they are? Perhaps certain words or phrases
do equal the phenomena that they seek to portray. However,
around and in specific phenomena rests the great world itself.
It is this great world that is distinct from the world built up
through words. And it is distinct because its worldhood
surpasses expression.
The premise of this argument is not that words lack the ability
to produce a sense of world at all. The case is quite the
reverse. It is only in realizing that words make a world that
the ironic nature of literature emerges. A world of words is
built up in a novel or poem through the engagement of
sentence with sentence, the linking of dialogue and
description, the intersection of numerous perspectives on
single events, the magnification of intricate elements of life
that we always pass by too hurriedly. An author composes a
world through perspicuous insights and dramatic inflections in
a story-line. Even out of thin strands of language that seem
insufficient to constitute any more than a veneer the surest
intensity can be accomplished. However, this world made of
words that surrounds me as I read is not even an echo of the
world of my quotidian existence. The latter is fertile, dark, and
vast, imbued with the uncertainty of fate; yet I am, in a
particular effortless way, involved in it. The world of the word
and the world in which I exist are remote. That this latter
fecund world is linked to the world of words in the literary
creation is irony. However, the connection is ironic not
because the objective world of the novel is structured by
consciousness while the real world is fragile and incomplete;
not, that is, because the literary work is always colored by the
only perspective from which it can know. It is ironic because
the crescendo of writing is not the ineffable but the merely
expressible and because, despite the fact that they may say
only what can be said, literary creations still mean the real
world and bring it forth. What is said in the creation is all that
words can express; what is in the creation is the world in
which I exist. This makes literature ironic.
It is important to be clear on this point. My claim is not that
the world of words and the real world couple in the literary
creation and so engender some entirely original world, the
"new reality of the book"-that confused fermentation of
"reality" and "invention" that Christa Wolf experiences on the
occasion of a visit to the former home and haunts of
Dostoevsky in St. Petersburg, locations that also serve as the
setting for Crime and Punishment.[26] The world of words and
the real world always remain distinct, and even if, as Wolf
argues, we live just as much with Raskolnikov as we do with
Napoleon or Lenin, we do not live with him in precisely the
same way, and it is not the case that we fail to distinguish
between fictional characters and historical figures
ontologically.[27] My argument regarding the irony of
literature is that literary creations are constituted by both the
world of the words and the real world: the former is an overt
construction by the author, the latter is a hidden meaning that
emerges only via the reader's reflection on the world of words
itself. The world of the book is composed in part by the real
world, while the real world is at most impinged upon by
fictions.
Yet in order to properly reveal literature for irony, the
argument presented thus far must go on to address the way in
which the world of words invites its own intersection with
reality. How does literature achieve the ironic encounter? A
connection between the world of words and reality does not
come about through sheer coincidence nor is it the result of
the projection of fictional events onto a real backdrop. Rather,
it occurs by means of the reader's own sense that what
presents itself in the book is lacking. This world is very much
like that world in which I live, but it is devoid of all that makes
reality full and diverse and insuperable. If the world of words is
a representation or an expression of that world, then it is no
more than a lie. Yet the creation is vivid, it does achieve the
reality that seems to evade written expression; it does so
when the reader is willing to stretch beyond the obvious and
apprehend for him- or herself a relationship between the world
of the words and the real world. Only in thinking not just
actively and cleverly but also imaginatively does s/he render
complete and true a creation which, accepted at face value, is
deficient and false. In this way, the novel or poem becomes
for the reader greater than the words on the page. The farther
into the written world s/he is led, the more arises an
unquestioning awareness that the world of the creation lies far
beyond the word. It becomes reductive to suppose that the
creation is all that good writing has managed to manifest. The
literary creation is the world of life and the world that has
been written down. It is these two worlds, discrete as they are,
that constitute the book as a work of art.
However, the suggestion that writing that unleashes words on
the construction of worlds cannot achieve the complexity and
unity of the real world may seem paradoxical. Are words
expended on description of ephemeral moments or the
communication of eviscerating passions just words wasted?
Are references to the "skill of the writer" mere delusions? I
mean to go on to suggest that irony is the only possibility for
writing, and that the writer's skill is to be discovered in the
way that s/he confronts his or her own scepticism concerning
his or her ability to say all that s/he means. However, before
doing so, I wish to clarify a prospective point of confusion that
may arise in the context of reflection on irony and literature.
4. Irony and Symbol
The theorizing of the work of art as a symbol is drawn out of
Goethe, and has become most familiar as given in the writings
of Heidegger and Gadamer. In Truth and Method, Gadamer
distinguishes the symbol thus:
In representing, the symbol takes the place of
something: that is, it makes something
immediately present. Only because it thus
presents the presence of what it represents is the
symbol itself treated with the reverence due to
the symbolized.[28]
He describes the symbolism of the work of art as lying in the
fact that:
In any encounter with art, it is not the particular,
but rather the totality of the experienceable
world, man's ontological place in it, and above all
his finitude before that which transcends him,
that is brought to experience.[29]
Irony is not a kind of symbolism. However, the qualities that
Gadamer attributes to art as symbolic and the properties that
I have ascribed to literature as ironic are, in critical respects,
similar. In both irony and symbolism a hierarchy of meanings
seems crucial; what is immediately evident does not constitute
the real intention. The description that Gadamer gives of the
symbolic might equally be applied to the ironic; both depend
on the "intricate interplay of showing and concealing."[30]
Before concluding this paper, I feel it is necessary to
demonstrate that I have done more than simply propose
symbolism by another name. Why, then, is literature ironic
rather than symbolic?
There is a feature of the symbol that immediately
distinguishes irony from symbolism. Even in presenting, the
symbol represents. The ironic phrase, insofar as it holds out a
meaning to an audience, likewise presents; but it does not, in
holding out that meaning, stand for it. As Nietzsche suggests,
the purpose of the symbolic statue of a god for the Greeks-a
wooden obelisk of Apollo, a stone carving of Eros-was "to
excite the fear of beholding him."[31] In contrast, the
intention of the ironic statement is not itself to evoke a feeling
appropriate to something greater than itself, but to lead the
audience to an alternate meaning for which that response is
appropriate and that does, then, evoke it.
Given that irony has this important difference from the
symbol, is the literary creation rightly understood as symbolic
or ironic? Reference to Gadamer's reflection on the Christian
sacrament-archetypal of the symbolic relationship-according
to which "the bread and the wine of the sacrament are the
flesh and blood of Christ," is elucidative here.[32] The world
built from words in the novel or the poem is no sacrament, to
be taken in and revered as if it were the reality itself and not
separate from it; rather, the world of words is in possession of
its own vital meaning. The world of words brings out the real
world, but this fictional world does not entirely "pass away," as
Gary Handwerk notes regarding the symbol, since it is an
equal part of the structure through which the novel or poem
attains itself as a creation.[33] The ironic phrase may be
negated, but whereas the symbol is usurped and replaced by
nothing more than what it already presents, the ironic phrase
brings forth something quite different from itself.
The world of words is a component of a creation that is
completed by what is hidden and brought forth. It is therefore
inappropriate to say, as we would on a symbolic understanding
of art, that the literary creation "does not refer to something,
because what it refers to is actually there"; what is there may
be there, but insofar as it is hidden it might as well be
absent.[34] Nor does it seem accurate to suggest that the
work of literature, as a symbolon immediately before us,
"points to, makes us see the whole"; literature is much more
than a sign.[35] Literature is irony because the reader is led,
not to recognize the totality where the writing once was, but
to see both the written and real worlds alongside one another
and as the completion of a creation. The symbol is that unique
possibility for two things to exist in the same place in the one
moment; irony is at best the opportunity for these two things
to exist side by side. It is the latter, I have suggested in this
paper, that most clearly identifies literary creations.
5. For What Reason Is Literature Ironic?
St. John of the Cross and Ludwig Wittgenstein examine the
relevance of silence for speech and writing. The final
proposition of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, numbered, starkly, 7,
announces, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over
in silence."[36] His cautionary instruction that silence is
sometimes the only fitting course proposes a form of
"mystical" silence that must be construed, not as the
repudiation of all utterances, but as the refusal to speak or
write because "one can make a linguistic response by leaving
unsaid what might be said."[37] The ambiguity of mystical
silence, whether it is, or has become, a fundamental tool of
the writer, is a question that has inspired numerous
discussions in literary theory, finding perhaps its most
intelligent critical treatment in the work of George Steiner.[38]
Central to such reflections is the suspicion that silence can
remain a "linguistic response" provided it is a means of
conveying a theme-a theme that is impossible to articulate.
Literary creations concern themselves with matters that make
an obligation of silence. Desire and fear, suffering and beauty
are all upraised in fictional writing, and remain notions of such
depth that verbalization can obfuscate as much as reveal
them. Yet beyond all else literary creations are involved with
the real world. As I argued in the previous section, this is a
world that cannot be captured in words. The real world is the
most eminent of admonitions to silence. The blunt impossibility
of presenting in words the richness of the world of our living
and its countless significances and interconnections impels a
writer to eschew the attempt to contain it; the author who
nonetheless seeks to lay out the entire world before his or her
reader brings about its loss. A poem or novel that struggles in
vain to fully articulate the manifold of the real world and to
replicate or mirror it in the creation will succeed only in
blanketing the real and never at conveying it. The outcome is
similar to that of discourse that Heidegger designates "idle
talk." When the use of language devolves to the status of idle
talk, "it serves not so much to keep Being-in-the-world open
to us in an articulated understanding, as rather to close it off
and cover up the entities within-the-world."[39] Works that
simply erect the world they have built up in language and
stretch it before us as a pretence rather than conveying the
real world by allowing it to enter through the words obscure
the reality of the world in which we are. They present not the
real world but some marvellous verbal construction that
affects, yet only as the imitation of something far more vast.
If the real world itself is insusceptible to expression, the
supreme work of literature consists in just that moment of
pristine silence that springs from the knowledge that nothing
can be said. The truest poem, the purest novel, can never be
written. Yet works are written. Why are there novels and
poems, not just blank pages? Creations are-and are ironically-
because even if, following Wittgenstein, everything that cannot
be put into words makes itself manifest, what is right under
my nose may still be overlooked.[40] Which is not to suggest
that the real world is such a thing as those great truths of
goodness and justice that, lacking frequent reiteration, would
be just as likely to be neglected as remembered; it is merely
to say that reality is not forever set forth and depends on the
writer to produce it. The peculiar sense that makes the author,
the germinating fear that decides his or her, is the thought
that the real world can be forgotten, and that even if its
heights cannot be attained by a world made up of words, they
may at least be pointed out beyond the rim of clouds that
defines the limits of expression and so be scaled by a reader
whose feet were once fast in the valley's decline.
The distinction between novels and poems that convey the
world ironically and those that pour into the mind of their
reader only an unquenching draught of images, characters and
plot can be made more precise by juxtaposing writing that
does not rely upon the retention of the connection between
the real world and the world of words for its success as
literature, with that for which the sustenance of this
connection is integral to its nature. We might contrast Conan
Doyle's The Lost World with Conrad's Heart of Darkness, or
Mitchell's Gone With the Wind with Faulkner's Absalom!
Absalom!. We might likewise judge the genius for world-
construction of Dickens against the talent for world-production
of George Eliot.[41] In David Copperfield we experience a
world that is awoken for us through the celebration of its
minutiae; in Daniel Deronda we enjoy a world crafted with
equal skill, yet one that, through Eliot's frequent philosophical
asides, retains the notion of itself as pervious to the real
world.[42] However, if a certain rank of novels and poems are
more ironic than a certain other group, does it follow from this
that our judgment concerning the quality of a particular piece
of literature is necessarily or no more than a product of the
extent to that it is ironic?
Such literary creations as I have already identified as
channelling the real world through the world of words make a
claim to quality on the basis of their reticence. We might
compare them with the ironist who, in avoiding direct
expression, broaches a topic and at the same time pre-empts
accusations of tastelessness, tactlessness and obtrusiveness,
even if, in so doing, s/he invites charges of cynicism or
insincerity. Those books are unsophisticated that overshadow
existence by offering a world of words too thoroughly woven to
allow the real world to pass on through it, and in attempting to
relate what is unsayable they become either an inferior ersatz
or an arrogating trespasser on a sacred and nameless real.
Nevertheless, if a lack of due discretion can constitute grounds
for the criticism of artworks, few achievements have ever been
affirmed as great on account of their tactfulness. Poems and
novels display an artist's virtuosity and lead the substantive
themes of human life along the unworn path of their own
sublimation. The excellence of a book depends on far more
than the extent to that it is ironic, and there are surer bases
for calling a piece of writing great, if all that irony can inspire
in us is gratitude for literature's appropriate hesitancy.
However, it is not due to its positive contribution to our
aesthetic evaluation of a piece of writing that irony is of
paramount significance. It is a world of words, as a product,
artefact or object, that is most conducive to the formation of
aesthetic judgments, but the world of the literary creation is
comprised of both this world of words and the real world.
When we recall Kierkegaard's suggestion that irony
characterizes a work in its entire, it becomes clear that the
irony of the novel or poem is something more pervasive than
the use of language and the exploration of vital themes. Irony
elevates a novel or a poem, extracting it from an aesthetic
category that tolerates and even affirms it as a falsified image
of life, repairing it as the re-entry of the real world.[43] The
impressiveness of works and the foundation of the claim of a
novel or poem to be honest are separate matters, and it is the
latter rather than the former to which irony makes its
contribution. Ironic works are superior to such books as are
resistant to irony only because we already consider
faithfulness a finer thing than falsehood, honesty more
momentous than pretence, and a literary creation therefore
richer than a world of words that obscures the real world by
embellishing it.
Irony is the key to the accomplishment of honest, faithful
literature, rather than a quality as a result of the presence by
which we form an aesthetic evaluation of a book. Yet how does
a reader appreciate the extent to that a novel or a poem is
ironic? Towards the end of the third section, I argued that this
realization is a product of a sense in the reader that something
in the book is lacking. Is this sufficient? Perhaps it was
adequate when addressing literature in general; yet in this
section I have referred to pure and true literary creations,
particular artworks that embrace the unsayable without
violating it: how do these creations convey to the reader the
primacy, not of the world of words, but of the reality to which
silence is the appropriate response? This is a difficult question
because it must respect the fact that irony is a craft of the
utmost subtlety. If there is a means through which a reader
understands a piece of writing as ironic, it cannot be explicit or
overt and must at least introduce the possibility of its own
misinterpretation. As I have already noted, in classical irony it
was the use of the gesture that aided the recognition and
discovery of the higher meaning of ironic discourse. The
mechanism through which paradigmatically ironic literature
conveys its status to a reader can be understood in a similar
way. It is the inclusion of the gesture-that can in writing be
thematic, stylistic, structural, or a function of the plot-that
opens up the world of words for the real world. I have already
made mention of one example of the gesture-the asides that
occur in Eliot's Middlemarch. However, deeper consideration of
two novels that exemplify irony and that present this ironic
nature to the reader will serve to legitimize and explicate this
concept.
Steiner attaches special importance to Hermann Broch's The
Death of Virgil in the context of discourse on what cannot be
articulated, describing it, along with Wittgenstein's Tractatus,
as a work that is "pervaded by the authority of silence."[44]
Broch's novel creates a sumptuous world of words, a world
that lies on the fringes of life itself, yet for all that this world is
developed and refined throughout the novel, its sheer
contingency as a world of language is repeatedly affirmed. The
phrase, "Burn the Aeneid!" that demands of the poet Virgil the
destruction of his finest work, is a reproof to those who would
imagine language to be the equal of the real.[45] Yet this
phrase is still more telling as a gesture towards the
vulnerability of The Death of Virgil itself as an artefact formed
out of words. An allegorical relationship is incorporated
through the proposed immolation of the Aeneid: if the
language of Virgil's revered text does no justice to the real
world, so too must Broch's novel and its words likewise be
inadequate. All language is fallible insofar as it is unable to
answer the inevitable critique from the world of life.[46]
However, the consequence of the failure of words to reach the
real world is not the reduction of the novel to empty
insincerity. Even as it propounds the inadequacy of a world
cast of words, The Death of Virgil always maintains the
primacy of what cannot be said:
For this voice of all voices was beyond any
speech whatsoever, more compelling than any,
even more compelling than music, than any
poem; this was the heart's beat, and must be in
its single beat, since only thus was it able to
embrace the perceived unity of existence in the
instant of the heart's beat, the eye's glance; this,
the very voice of the incomprehensible which
expresses the incomprehensible, was in itself
incomprehensible, unattainable through human
speech, unattainable through earthy symbols. .
.[47]
Language fails to reach the inexpressible, but what is
unsayable retains a peculiar significance. As Virgil's stream of
consciousness tells, what cannot be said remains "compelling."
Broch's novel indicates that we remain most tightly bound to
this ineffable real world, that it is the unsayable, as a
category, that bears the utmost significance for human beings.
In questioning the use of language, The Death of Virgil creates
the space for the entry of reality and, in promoting the
inexpressible, it reminds the reader of what is truly
substantial. Even if the reader is not directly brought to
understand that it is upon him or her that responsibility for the
emergence of the real world falls, the unsayable that s/he,
more than language, can reach, is nonetheless proposed as
the true concern of literary creations.
William Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! is a novel that
overwhelms the reader through a radical structure and an
innovative and frequently bemusing use of language.[48] Yet
Absalom, Absalom! also subtly reminds the reader of his or
her own importance to the completion of the literary creation.
In the discussion between Shreve and Quentin that is the
basis for the second half of the novel, Shreve, the nominal
"reader" of Quentin's "text," eventually emerges as a
contributor to the narrative. Early in chapter VI, Shreve is
positioned as audience to the story of Sutpen, Aunt Rosa,
Henry, Judith and Bon; in fact, he proposes himself for this
role by ordering Quentin to assume the burden of narrator:
"Tell about the South. What's it like there. What do they do
there. Why do they live there. Why do they live at all."[49] Yet
by chapter VIII, the relationship between the author of the
story (Quentin) and its reader (Shreve), has been
transformed:
It was Shreve speaking, though save for the
slight difference which the intervening degrees of
latitude had inculcated in them (differences not in
tone or pitch but of turns of phrase and usage of
words), it might have been either of them and
was in a sense both.[50]
By the conclusion of the novel, the factical reader is led by the
one narrative voice-a voice not easily distinguishable as that
of either Quentin or Shreve-that relates the story of the
Sutpen family.[51]
The engagement of the fictional reader with the fictional
author and the completion of the narrative world through their
common enterprise presents to the factical reader his or her
own task in reading. As Pitavy has noted, it is the attitude that
Shreve adopts towards Quentin's story that facilitates the
factical reader's involvement in the narrative; Shreve has a
function analogous to that of the reader.[52] What is this
function? Although we should not presume his opinion
faultless, Faulkner himself offers an interesting insight into the
role of Shreve in Absalom, Absalom!. In a lecture given at the
University of Virginia, Faulkner said:
The story was told by Quentin to Shreve. Shreve
was the commentator that held the thing to
something of reality. If Quentin had been let
alone to tell it, it would have become something
completely unreal. It had to have a solvent to
keep it real, keep it believable, creditable,
otherwise it would have vanished into smoke and
fury.[53]
Were Shreve absent, Quentin's account would be reduced to a
façade: it requires an input from without to make of it
something real. Yet the necessity of this addition by the reader
to the narrative ramifies, not merely within the plot, but
between the open page and the audience to the novel. The
character of Shreve provides the reader of Absalom, Absalom!
with a hint as to the nature of his or her own task: Quentin's
word itself cannot suffice for truth and requires Shreve's
contribution for its fulfilment. The world that has been written
down is incomplete and depends upon the real world in order
to be something, rather than to just seem. This world that is
beyond speech can be introduced by the reader alone. Like
The Death of Virgil, Absalom, Absalom! demonstrates that a
world of words is inadequate, and this on its own suffices for
us to view the novel as a paradigm of irony. Yet Faulkner's
work goes still further than Broch's: it indicates to the reader
the essential contribution that s/he can and must make to the
literary creation-a contribution through which the book
becomes complete.
6. Conclusion
I began this paper with Kierkegaard's Socrates. Yet it was
Plato's Socrates who inspired all doubts as to the real value of
literature.[54] Perhaps art seeks only to impress its audience;
poetry tells no lies since it makes no assertions; literature
refines us, but gives us no new ideas about how the world
might be. The beauty of writing does no more than confound
us, and yet it is easy to love literature out of the longing to be
confounded, from a desire for that simple joy that thrives only
in words not suspended from facts. Then there is that
contrary, often repeated, theme: Literature returns something
to us, a purer truth that history and philosophy, in wresting it
forth from the hold of human life, isolate and diminish. If irony
makes literary creations it also reconciles these two thoughts.
Literature is beauty and reality and includes the dreamed and
the lived. Love it for no lesser reason than those.
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